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Richer countries are generally democratic. But this could reﬂect reverse
causation or omitted variables. Evidence that democratizations yield subse-
quent economic growth is quite weak. Political regimes may still inﬂuence
economic development, but the eﬀects appear diﬃcult to identify from the
within-country variation. A plausible reason for this diﬃculty is that “democ-
racy” is too blunt a concept. Political regimes come in various forms and
are reformed in diﬀerent circumstances. This paper illustrates three speciﬁc
instances where the details of democratic reform inﬂuence their economic
eﬀects.
Section I zooms in on the interplay between democratizations and eco-
nomic liberalizations. Both induce accelerations of growth, but the sequence
of reforms is crucial: countries liberalizing their economy before extending
political rights do better. Section II considers diﬀerent forms of democracy.
Speciﬁc democratic institutions inﬂuence the ﬁscal and trade policies imple-
mented after democratization, which may explain why presidential democ-
racy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy. Section III distin-
guishes expected and actual political reforms. Taking expectations of regime
change into account helps identify a stronger growth eﬀect of democracy.
1We ﬁrst we clarify our methodology. While political institutions are gen-
erally very persistent, they sometimes change suddenly and drastically — as in
many democratizations or coups. Under appropriate identifying assumptions,
such regime changes can be exploited by comparing average performance be-
fore and after the event. Our sample has annual observations for about 150
countries and includes about 120 regime changes over the period 1960-2000;
in Section III, we backdate the panel to the mid-1800s, with twice as many
regime changes. We classify a country as democratic if the polity2 variable in
the Polity IV data set is strictly positive.1 Per-capita income comes from the
Penn World Tables for 1960-2000 and the Maddison data set for 1850-2000.
We estimate a panel regression:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = βyi,t−1 + φDi,t + ρxi,t + αi + θt + ǫi,t , (1)
where yi,t denotes (log) per capita income in country i and year t, Di,t is
a dummy variable equal to one under democracy, xi,t is a vector of control
variables, αi and θt are country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, we estimate the
parameter φ by diﬀerence in diﬀerences, where countries changing regime are
the “treated”, and those that do not are the “controls”.
Identiﬁcation requires that the selection of countries into democracy be
uncorrelated with the country-speciﬁc and time-varying growth shock, ǫi,t.
This allows any correlation between regime selection and the country ﬁxed
eﬀect, αi — e.g., that fast-growing countries more likely become democratic
than slow-growing ones. However, absent any regime change, average growth
in reform countries should (counterfactually) have been the same as in non-
reform countries (conditional on xi,t). A concrete case where we might con-
found economic and political reforms is the 1990s, when many formerly com-
2munist regimes introduced democracy as well as market economy. Therefore,
we include in xi,t a binary indicator for years after 1989 in the former So-
viet bloc. We also include indicators for years of wars (current and lagged),
as they are correlated with regime changes and growth. Most speciﬁcations
also include dummy variables for continental location (Africa, Asia and Latin
America) and socialist legal origin interacted with year dummy variables. To
reduce serial correlation and allow for convergence, lagged per-capita income
is always included.
Circumstances surrounding regime changes diﬀer widely across time and
location, as do the political institutions adopted or abandoned. Thus, the
eﬀects of a crude democracy indicator are likely to diﬀer across observations.
If we neglect this heterogeneity and estimate the average eﬀect of democracy
as in (1), ǫi,t also includes the term (φi,t − φ)Di,t, where φi,t is the eﬀect
of democracy in country i and year t. Identiﬁcation of φ now requires the
heterogeneous reform eﬀect to be uncorrelated with its occurrence. This
assumption fails if countries self-select into democracy based on the growth
eﬀect of regime changes (e.g., Di,t = 1 more likely when φi,t > φ). Below, we
decompose the eﬀects of political reforms according to observable features,
one at a time. Studying the economic outcomes of speciﬁc types of reforms
is relevant from a practical point of view, and as a test of speciﬁc hypothesis.
This also makes identiﬁcation of φ more credible by reducing unobserved
heterogeneity; the relative eﬀect of speciﬁc reforms can be identiﬁed under
weaker assumptions than those needed to identify their average eﬀect φ.
I. Economic liberalization and democracy
This section draws on Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005). In Table 1, we start by
3estimating the average eﬀect of democracy on growth, φ in (1). Column 1
suggests that becoming a democracy accelerates growth by 0.75 percentage
points, a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect (the results are similar with standard
errors clustered by country). With an estimated convergence rate of 6 percent
per year (parameter β in (1)), the long-run eﬀect on income per capita is 12.5
percent. Controlling for years preceding and following the regime change does
not aﬀect the estimate, although growth slows down around the transition.
Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis (2004) and Dani Rodrik and
Romain Wacziarg (2005) also show that democracy promotes growth.
Democratization is often associated with economic reforms, such as open-
ing the economy to international trade and extending the role of markets.
Sometimes economic liberalization leads democratization, more often it lags
by a few years — perhaps because similar forces push for both kinds of reforms.
Joint economic and political reforms could violate our identifying assump-
tions, however. Not controlling for economic reforms could bias upwards the
estimated eﬀect of democracy, via positive correlation between Di,t and ǫi,t
in (1).
We use the same indicator of economic liberalizations as Giavazzi and
Tabellini (the original source is Jeﬀrey Sachs and Andrew Werner, 1995)
to estimate a multiple treatment equation. In column 2, we thus include
both the democracy and liberalization indicators. Both reforms retain a
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on growth, with economic reform having the
stronger eﬀect.
Considering the joint eﬀect of reforms lends additional credibility to the
identifying assumption, but does not address heterogeneity in the sequence
4of reforms. Column 3 adds two dummy variables to the regression, which
equal unity when democracy is enacted ﬁrst or last, respectively, and equal
zero when only one type of reform occurs.2 Countries where economic liber-
alization preceded democracy include South Korea, Taiwan, Chile and Mex-
ico. The opposite sequence took place in countries as Argentina, Brazil, the
Philippines and Bangladesh.
Enacting only one reform still has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
growth, similar to those in columns 1 and 2. Moreover, the estimated co-
eﬃcient of “democracy after liberalization” is positive and signiﬁcant: the
boost to growth from the two reforms is about 3.5 percent. But “liberaliza-
tion after democracy” is negative and signiﬁcant, implying an overall eﬀect
which is barely positive and statistically insigniﬁcant. Giavazzi and Tabellini
(2005) show that this ﬁnding is very robust. A plausible interpretation is that
young democracies in closed economic environments are more likely bogged
down in redistributive conﬂict and populist policies, while young democracies
in open economies are forced to pay more attention to economic eﬃciency.
Moreover, opening the economy often goes hand in hand with securing the
protection of property rights and enforcing the rule of law, which may be a
prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. Naturally, the usual caveats
about identiﬁcation apply. Naturally, the usual caveats about identiﬁcation
apply. But if the estimates do uncover a causal eﬀect, reformers of closed
autocracies ought to give priority to economic over political liberalization.
II. Forms of democracy
This section draws on Persson (2005), who studies heterogeneity in the kind
of democratic institutions adopted or abandoned. Political scientists stress
5distinctions between diﬀerent electoral rules and diﬀerent forms of govern-
ment. In our own recent research, we have shown that these constitutional
forms imply systematic diﬀerences in economic policies. Do they also imply
diﬀerent growth eﬀects of becoming a democracy?
Column 1 of Table 2 decomposes the average growth eﬀect of democracy
by adding two binary variables, one for the form of government (presidential
vs. parliamentary), one for the electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional).
Otherwise, the regression is identical to column 1 of Table 1.3 The coeﬃcient
on democracy now picks up the default eﬀect of becoming a presidential and
majoritarian democracy. A new parliamentary democracy grows 1.5 percent-
age points less than a new presidential democracy and about 0.5 points less
than a previous autocracy, although the latter estimate is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The electoral system has no inﬂuence on the growth
eﬀect of democracy.
A possible explanation for these results is induced policy changes. Based
on cross-sectional estimates within a sample of democracies, Persson and
Tabellini (2003, 2004) found that parliamentary and proportional democra-
cies have larger government spending. In column 2, we estimate the eﬀect
on government consumption with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation in
(1).4 A new majoritarian and presidential democracy cuts government con-
sumption by almost 2 percent of GDP, while a new parliamentary democracy
raises it considerably. The diﬀerence in spending between the two forms of
government is a highly signiﬁcant 5 percent of GDP. This estimate only
exploits time variation in countries that enter and exit democracy, but is
remarkably similar to our earlier estimates. Proportional rather than ma-
6joritarian elections raise spending by 1 percent of GDP. This eﬀect is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant but smaller than our previous cross-sectional estimates,
probably due to the exclusion of transfers (we found that electoral rules have
particularly strong eﬀect on welfare-state spending).
How about other polices? Persson (2005) argues that since parliamen-
tary and proportional democracies seek consensus among broader coalitions
of voters, they should not only have larger government spending, but also less
protectionist trade polices. In column 3, we thus estimate the eﬀect on the
liberalization indicator used in Section I. Introducing parliamentary or pro-
portional democracy each raises the probability of a subsequent liberalization
by about 10 percentage points, compared to majoritarian and presidential
democracy.
These policy outcomes may explain the growth eﬀects. A new parlia-
mentary democracy is more prone to pursue economic liberalizations than
a new presidential democracy. But as we saw earlier, liberalizations follow-
ing democratizations have weaker eﬀects on growth.5 At the same time,
parliamentary democracies raise government consumption much more than
presidential democracies. If this spending binge distorts economic activity,
growth may suﬀer. While the electoral system also shapes policy, the spend-
ing binge in proportional democracies is smaller and may not show up in the
growth rate.
III. Expected and actual democracy
This section draws on Persson and Tabellini (2005). If democracy has positive
growth eﬀects it raises the returns to investment. As investment reacts to ex-
pectations, both actual and expected regime changes aﬀect growth. Growth
7would thus decelerate well before an imminent, and anticipated, coup. This
would contradict our identifying assumption in (1), by creating a negative
correlation between democracy, Di,t, and the growth residual, ǫi,t, and biases
down our estimate of φ — the growth eﬀect of democracy.
Motivated by this observation, Persson and Tabellini (2005) formulate
a theoretical model of economic and political change, where countries sto-
chastically enter and exit from democracy with probabilities inﬂuenced by
current and lagged income. The probability of regime change also depends
on a country’s “democratic capital”, which shapes the willingness of its citi-
zens to stand up for democracy. Democratic capital accumulates in years of
democracy and in countries with democratic neighbors, but depreciates un-
der autocracy. Identiﬁcation is achieved by an exclusion restriction derived
in the model, namely that democratic capital has no direct eﬀect on growth
(given all the other controls).
We thus add to (1) the probability of regime change — in the form of
a hazard rate — as estimated by Persson and Tabellini (2005). The growth
equation is consistent with the estimated hazard rate and the sample is now
1850-2000.6As country and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included, we estimate the
eﬀects of expected democracy entirely from the time variation in the hazard
rate.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 report the estimated results within
regimes, conﬁning attention to observations under democracy only, or autoc-
racy only. Under democracy, the probability of regime change hurts growth,
consistent with the ﬁnding that democracy raises growth. The large nega-
tive estimated coeﬃcient reﬂects the dimension of the estimated hazard rate,
8which is typically below 10%, with an average of 3. A fall in the hazard
by 2 percentage points thus raises growth by about 0.5 percentage points.
Similar eﬀects are obtained by replacing growth with investment over the
1960-2000 sample. Under autocracy, the probability of regime change ought
to spur growth. Instead, the coeﬃcient is negative and insigniﬁcant. One
interpretation is that we have omitted further heterogeneity, such that de-
mocratic reforms fail to boost economic performance in some autocracies.
Alternatively, political uncertainty exerts an oﬀsetting negative eﬀect.
In column 3, we study actual as well as expected political regimes in the
full sample, including the democracy dummy plus the probability of autoc-
racy in the current period (also interacted with lagged democracy, allowing
the eﬀect of expectations to diﬀer by regime).7In addition to the exclusion
restriction for democratic capital, identiﬁcation relies on the usual identify-
ing assumption — ǫi,t uncorrelated with Di,t — now made more credible by
including the probability of autocracy as a regressor. This speciﬁcation is
demanding, as actual democracy and the probability of autocracy are highly
collinear. Nevertheless, the results support the idea that expected as well as
actual regime changes play a role. Actual democracy now induces a growth
acceleration of over 1 percent. The estimated convergence rate (2.8 per-
cent) implies a long-run income rise of 35 percent. This growth eﬀect is
larger than the benchmark estimate in Table 1. More importantly, it is also
much larger than in the same speciﬁcation over 150 years of data, where ex-
pectations are neglected (see Persson and Tabellini, 2005). Thus, including
expected regime changes indeed brings out a more forceful eﬀect of actual
transitions on growth. The results in this section imply that stable and per-
9sistent democracy has a stronger eﬀect on development than democracy per
se.
Taken together, the results in our paper suggest that democracy is in-
deed too blunt a concept: the devil is in the details. Future theoretical and
empirical work should pay close attention to the heterogeneity of political
reforms.
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1 Large changes in polity2 are generally clustered around 0. Although lower
than that often chosen by political scientists, this threshold more easily cap-
tures the eﬀect of discrete political reforms. We discard reforms in the last
three years of the sample, setting to missing the observations of outcomes
after such reforms. At the start of the sample, we only require one available
observation before the reform.
2 To unambiguously identify the sequence, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) only
classify episodes that last at least four years as reforms, omitting temporary
changes in political or economic institutions. The variables in column 3 of
Table 1 use this classiﬁcation, which diﬀers slightly from that in the preceding
columns for a few countries.
3 Table 2 assumes the eﬀect of the form of government and the electoral
system to be additive. The results are robust to relaxing this assumption.
4 While Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) use IMF data for central gov-
ernment spending (including transfers), here we use Penn World Tables for
central plus local government consumption, in percent of GDP.
135 Indeed, all countries that ﬁrst opened the economy, and then democratized,
became presidential democracies, while the opposite sequence is observed for
both forms of government.
6 The speciﬁcation of the hazard rate includes democratic capital, lagged
per capita income, a dummy variable for war years (current and lagged),
dummy variables for democracy at independence, colonial origin, geographic
location, socialist legal origin, and a linear and quadratic time trend.
7 Adam Przeworski et al (2000) consider the eﬀect of expected regime changes
on economic growth in the post war period.
14Table 1     Effects of political and economic 
reforms on economic growth    
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Democracy    0.75**                                   
(0.34) 




Liberalization       0.92** 
(0.39) 








   
  -1.71***                          
(0.62) 
       
N. of countries  138  130  130 
N. of observations  4338  4229  4229 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specification 
described in text.  Table 2  Forms of democracy, growth and 
economic policies    
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Growth  Government 
consumption 
Liberalization 
Democracy    1.00**                                   
(0.51) 
-   1.87***                                          
(0.54) 




- 1.61***                                    
(0.59) 
    4.89*** 
(0.79) 




0.16                                                                                        
(0.49) 
   1.15**                                            
(0.49) 
    0.11***                                           
(0.03) 
       
N. countries  138  150  132 
N. observations  4338  4552  4578 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specification identical to that 
in Table 1, except that lagged income is excluded in cols 2 and 3.   Table 3     Expected democracy, actual democracy and 
growth  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Democracies  Autocracies  Full sample 
 
Hazard rate out of 
current regime  
-  20.05***                
(5.51) 
- 17.85 
   (11.93) 
 
Democracy       




   
0.47              
(0.73) 
Prob. of autocracy in 
lagged democracy  
    - 3.42               
(2.52) 
       
N.  countries  107  117  148 
N. observations  3656  4130  8135 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses:  significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% .  Control variables: country and year 
fixed effects, lagged income, dummy variable for wars and lagged wars, 
dummy variable for former socialist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe plus former Soviet Union after 1990. Transition years excluded. 
 